Decarbonisation Technology August 2026 Issue

CCS Sakakemang (2027) Repsol, dedicated storage

Balikpapan renery Pertamina, Air Liquide, use and storage

Banggai ammonia (2028) Pertamina, unknown fate

Ramba CCUS (2030) Pertamina, EOR

Tangguh LNG (2026) BP, EGR

Arun CCS hub (2027)

South China Sea

Pacic Ocean

Central Sumatera Basin CCUS hub (2028)

East Kalimantan CCUS hub

Gemah eld storage (2028)

Nagoya terminal (Japan)

INDONESIA

Kutai Basin Basin CCUS hub (2028)

Tangguh CC U S hub (phase 2 (2030)

Sunda Asri Basin CCUS hub (2029)

Indian Ocean

Muara Enim DME (2024) Pertamina, unknown fate

Gas power CCUS MoU GE Vemona, BP and partners, dedicated storage

Abadi LNG (2026) Inpex Masela, Shell, unknown fate

Sukowati (2028) Pertamina, EOR

Gundih eld (2026) Pertamina, EGR

Capture or full chain

Storage

Notes: LNG = Liquied natural gas EGR = Enhanced gas recovery EOR = Ehanced oil recovery

Coal-to-liquids Ammonia plant

Renery

Natural gas processing (including LNG)

CO2 storage hub

Power

Figure 3 Map of CCUS projects under development in Indonesia (2023)

(IEA, 2023)

Japan: Backbone first, emitters second What does it actually take to turn CCS ambition into bankable infrastructure? Japan has spent the last decade answering that question, and the answer is consistently the same: build the backbone before asking emitters to commit. Rather than funding individual capture projects, Tokyo structured its programme around shared infrastructure from the outset, standardised subsurface appraisal, common transport architecture, and a licensing framework that treats storage rights as property assets with security of tenure. Capital followed certainty, not the other way around. Japan has assembled an impressive scale of projects that has captured the attention of Southeast Asia. In 2024, the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security’s (JOGMEC) selected nine Advanced CCS Projects, targeting 6-12 Mtpa of storage by 2030 across industrial clusters spanning power, steel, chemicals, and cement, with FIDs gated at fiscal year 2026 (METI, 2024). Four of those nine projects are explicitly designed around overseas Asia-Pacific reservoirs rather than domestic geology. Japan is not just a policy model for ASEAN; it is an active, capital-backed buyer of storage capacity.

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam are now working to position themselves as suppliers to meet this demand. The Higashi-Niigata cluster illustrates what this looks like at project level. Approximately 10 Mt/y of emissions from co-located chemical plants and thermal power assets are within pipeline reach of depleted gas fields already screened for injectivity. Basic engineering design and storage potential assessment are underway, with a 2030 operational target (Mitsubishi Gas Chemical, 2024) . The source-to- sink geometry, multisector demand aggregation, and shared pipeline logic are structurally identical to what Vietnam and Indonesia are now developing, with the difference being that Japan is roughly 18 months closer to a binding investment decision. That gap matters. The corridors that reach proven storage first will not simply cut emissions sooner. They will define the commercial and contractual architecture that later entrants inherit. Both emitter and storage nations understand this, which is why early positioning is already shaping bilateral negotiations across the region. It is precisely that dynamic, a regional market forming in real time, that gives the Singapore-